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Lochner v. New York (1905) and
Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008):
Judicial Reliance on Adversary Argument
by DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS*
Introduction
It was Thursday morning, February 23, 1905, and Chief Justice
Melville W. Fuller opened oral argument in a case destined to shape
the course of American constitutional history. The Supreme Court's
calendar that day included a largely unnoticed appeal by Joseph
Lochner, the owner of a small bakery in Utica, a city of about 63,000
persons in rural upstate New York.' Three years earlier, the state had
fined Lochner $50 for employing a worker for more than sixty hours a
week in violation of the state's Bakeshop Act, a maximum-hours law
passed unanimously by both houses of the legislature and swiftly
signed by Governor Levi P. Morton in 1895.
By a narrow five-to-four vote, the Court reversed the bakery
owner's misdemeanor conviction. Writing for the majority, Justice
Rufus W. Peckham held that the Act violated "liberty of contract," an
interest that a few Court decisions had found in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The constitutional liberty enjoyed
by Joseph Lochner and his employees alike, wrote Justice Peckham,
turned on whether the 1895 legislation was "a fair, reasonable and
appropriate exercise of the police power of the State," or whether the
legislation was "an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or
to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. B.A. 1973,
Wesleyan University; J.D. 1976, Columbia University School of Law.
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICS OF
CITIES HAVING A POPULATION OF OVER 30,000: 1906, at 88 (1908) (stating 1905 Utica
population as 63,647 persons).
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him appropriate and necessary for the support of himself and his
family."'
Lochner's slender majority chose the latter, and Justices John
Marshall Harlan and Oliver Wendell Holmes filed stinging dissents.
Writing for himself and Justices Edward Douglass White and William
R. Day, Justice Harlan accused the Court of "seriously crippl[ing] the
inherent power of the States to care for the lives, health and well-
being of their citizens."'
In one of the most memorable dissents in Supreme Court history,
Justice Holmes charged that the majority had embraced "an
economic theory which a large part of the country does not
entertain," namely, laissez faire economics associated with Herbert
Spencer's Social Darwinism, which taught that a nation's economy
develops best when the fittest survive in the marketplace free from
government regulation.4 Holmes argued that by empowering courts
to impose their own economic views on the nation, Lochner thwarted
"the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law."'
The Supreme Court interred Lochner's economic substantive
due process doctrine by 1937, but the decision "continues to hover
over constitutional law like a ghost."' Lochner's immortality
highlights an intriguing question (discussed in Part I of this article)
concerning the choices of two swing Justices to join the bare majority.
If the brief filed by the losing New York Attorney General had not
appeared so paltry next to the sterling brief of Joseph Lochner's
winning counsel, might the Court have ruled the other way?
Even for today's lawyers who may never argue an appeal as
profound as Lochner, the Court's evident turnabout from an apparent
razor-thin victory for the state to a victory for the convicted
defendant underscores judicial reliance on advocacy in the adversary
system of civil and criminal justice. This reliance assumed the
Supreme Court spotlight most recently in 2008, when Kennedy v.
Louisiana held, five-to-four, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
3. Id. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
5. Id.
6. Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 221,
222-23 (1999); see also, e.g., Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Rehabilitated and Revised,
But Still Reviled, 20 J. SUP. Cr. HIST. 31 (1995) ("Few cases in American history continue
to attract more attention" than Lochner); Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th Anniversary of
Lochner v. New York, 72 TENN. L. REv. 455, 456 (2005) ("one of the most intriguing
constitutional cases ever decided").
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imposition of the death penalty for rape of a child where the crime
did not result, and was not intended to result, in the victim's death.'
The confluence of capital punishment and the defendant's brutal
rape of his eight-year-old stepdaughter assured that Kennedy, decided
in the midst of the hotly contested presidential election campaign,
would rank as one of the most controversial decisions of the entire
Term. Within a day, Republican John McCain attacked Kennedy as
''an assault on law enforcement's efforts to punish these heinous
felons for the most despicable crime."' Democrat Barack Obama,
himself a former constitutional law professor at the University of
Chicago, agreed that "the rape of a small child, 6 or 8 years old, is a
heinous crime," and said that the Constitution permits states to
decide that "under narrow, limited, well-defined circumstances the
death penalty is at least potentially applicable."9
For the closely divided Court, Kennedy's Eighth Amendment
holding turned on whether a "national consensus" existed against
permitting capital punishment for nonfatal child rape. A day after the
presidential candidates weighed in, controversy grew when a blogger
reported a potentially significant oversight in the majority and
dissenting opinions. As the Court surveyed the landscape of
American law and disagreed about the consensus issue, no Justice
mentioned that Congress had overwhelmingly authorized capital
punishment for nonfatal child rape under military law in 2006, and
that a 2007 presidential executive order had implemented the
legislation by adding the authorization to the Manual for Courts-
Martial.
The Kennedy majority and the dissenters overlooked these
authorities because no party or amicus had cited or discussed them in
their briefs. Part II discusses the brief writers' lapse and the
institutional challenge that it caused the Court before and after the
state of Louisiana petitioned unsuccessfully for rehearing.
As Part III discusses, Lochner and Kennedy together
demonstrate the contemporary vitality of Justice Felix Frankfurter's
message that in the adversary system of civil and criminal justice, "the
7. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413, reh'g denied, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).
8. McCain, Obama Disagree with Child Rape Ruling, MSNBC (June 26, 2008, 1:26
PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25379987/ns/politics-decision_08/t/mccain-obama-disagree-
child-rape-ruling/.
9. Id.
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judicial process [is] at its best" when courts receive "comprehensive
briefs and powerful arguments on both sides.""o
I. Nineteen Pages That Changed History
To establish that New York's maximum-hours law was an
unreasonable exercise of the state's police power, Joseph Lochner's
counsel submitted a lengthy, carefully researched brief whose
appendix supplemented legal doctrine with research from medical
journals indicating that bakery work was not inherently hazardous to
employees' health." One scholar has called the submission "an
incipient 'Brandeis Brief."'" 2  The term "Brandeis Brief" today
describes a filing that combines legal analysis with relevant evidence
from the social sciences, but lawyer Louis D. Brandeis did not prevail
with his fabled Supreme Court submission until Muller v. Oregon,
which distinguished Lochner three years after the Utica bakery
owner's brief provided a useful template."
The New York Attorney General's office evidently did not take
Joseph Lochner's Supreme Court appeal seriously, a costly lapse that
seems particularly surprising because the state's two appellate courts
had each affirmed the conviction by only scant one-vote margins over
strong dissents. 4 Attorney General Julius M. Mayer's "incredibly
sketchy"" nineteen-page brief provided the Justices little factual
analysis or legal argument, few citations to precedent, and barely any
mention of medical authorities which plausibly indicated that toiling
twelve-hours per day for six to seven days each week in damp, dusty,
rat-infested bakeries in urban slum tenement cellars debilitated most
workers before they turned forty-five and caused many to die young."
The Attorney General did not even try to expand on medical
10. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
overruled in part on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
11. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective,
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1494-96 (2005).
12. Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 19 n.77 (1991).
13. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
14. People v. Lochner, 76 N.Y.S. 396 (App. Div. 1902) (3-2 vote), aff'd, 69 N.E. 373
(N.Y. 1904) (4-3 vote), rev'd, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. Paul Kens, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 127
(1998).
16. Id. at 6-14; David E. Bernstein, supra note 11, at 1494-96.
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discussion advanced by a concurring judge when the New York Court
17
of Appeals upheld Lochner's conviction.
Labor leader Samuel Gompers said later that the Court might
have decided Lochner differently if the Justices could have seen for
themselves the squalid working conditions that marked the nation's
bakeries, including the one in Utica, New York." With the Justices
unable to take testimony or receive other live evidence from
eyewitnesses or expert witnesses, however, the parties' briefs were
the Court's eyes and ears.
Historians have speculated about why the state Attorney
General's office paid only lip service to Joseph Lochner's Supreme
Court appeal. The likely reasons do not reflect well on the office's
approach to advocacy. Perhaps Attorney General Mayer assumed a
relatively easy victory because the Court, in Holden v. Hardy, had
upheld a state's maximum-hours statute for coal miners in 1898 by a
seemingly comfortable seven-to-two margin." Professor Paul Kens
suggests that, even if not overconfident, the Attorney General may
have lacked enthusiasm for the challenged Bakeshop Act because he
personally opposed most economic regulatory legislation.20 Perhaps
the Attorney General brushed aside Lochner's case because his office
faced deadlines in another Supreme Court appeal that seemed more
important, though the decision in the other appeal would ultimately
pass into history largely unremembered.2'
Whatever the impulse for the state's evident inattention in
Lochner, the imbalance that marked the parties' briefs may have
transformed a close decision for the state into a close decision for the
bakery owner. Evidence indicates that Justice Harlan initially drafted
the opinion of the Court, and that Justice Peckham initially drafted a
dissent. Justice Harlan's son later said that his father's original draft
was for the majority, and another commentator argued that the tone
and structure of Justice Harlan's ultimate dissent suggest the same.22
The two swing votes, Justices Henry Billings Brown and Joseph
McKenna, ended up joining the five-to-four majority under
17. People v. Lochner, 69 N.E. 373, 382-84 (N.Y. 1904) (Vann, J., concurring), rev'd,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
18. Paul Kens, supra note 6, at 35.
19. Holden v. Hardy 169 U.S. 366 (1898); David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v.
New York: Impediment to the Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STORIES 299, 317 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009).
20. Paul Kens, supra note 15, at 127.
21. Id. at 128; David E. Bernstein, supra note 11, at 1495-96.
22. David E. Bernstein, supra note 19, at 317 & n.109.
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circumstances that suggest that the parties' briefing played a
significant role in the outcome. Justice Brown had written the
majority opinion upholding maximum-hours legislation for mine
workers in Holden v. Hardy, and neither he nor Justice McKenna had
previously voted to strike down state labor legislation for violating
the Fourteenth Amendment.23
The two swing Justices likely switched from Harlan to Peckham
during the Court's internal deliberations. Professor David E.
Bernstein concludes that "the unusual votes of Brown and
McKenna ... can most plausibly be attributed to the creativity of
Lochner's brief in presenting a statistics-filled appendix showing that
baking was not an especially unhealthful profession, combined with
the singularly ineffective brief filed by New York."24
On April 17, Lochner's five-Justice majority-with Justices
Brown and McKenna safely on board-announced that "[tihere is, in
our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding [the 1895
Bakeshop Act] to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to
safeguard the public health, or the health of the individuals who are
following the trade of a baker."" To the contrary, the majority
concluded, the Act had "no . . . direct relation to, and no . . .
substantial effect upon, the health of the employee."26
The impact of Lochner, and thus the impact of the parties'
briefing in the case, has proved great: According to one leading
constitutional scholar, the decision "threatened the very legitimacy of
judicial review by setting the Court against the democratic branches
without doctrinal justification or institutional competence."2 7
Application of Lochner's dual touchstones-reasonableness and
arbitrariness-lay not with the political branches, but with a Court
that soon grew increasingly hostile to federal and state economic
regulation. By the time the nation confronted the depths of the
Depression in the early 1930s, the decision had morphed into a
23. Id. at 317.
24. Id. at 317-18.
25. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58.
26. Id. at 64.
27. Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Court in the Progressive Era, 22 J. SUP. Cr. HIST. 14,
18 (1997); see also, e.g., David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
373, (2003); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1386 (2001); David E. Bernstein,
Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 Geo. L.J. 1, 1-14 (2003).
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"constitutional monstrosit[y]" that "disembowel[ed] federal and state
efforts to protect workers from predatory employers."28
By the time the Supreme Court interred economic substantive
due process in 1937,29 the "Lochner era" had seen the Court strike
down nearly two hundred social welfare and regulatory measures.30
Lochner's demise led to Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's Footnote Four
in United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938), which foreshadowed
tiered analysis by contrasting the Court's new deference to economic
regulation with independent review of claims implicating civil rights
and personal liberties."
II. "The Parties to the Case Missed It"
In Kennedy v. Louisiana in 2008, the Court's Eighth Amendment
holding depended on whether capital punishment for nonfatal rape of
a child was consistent with "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."3 2 Writing for the majority,
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concluded that "[tihe evidence of a
national consensus with respect to the death penalty for child
rapists ... shows divided opinion but, on balance, an opinion against
it."" The Court stated that a rapist of a child could be executed in
only six of the thirty-six states that have capital punishment, and
could not be executed under federal law.34
Dissenting Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. (joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Thomas) forcefully challenged the
majority's finding of a national consensus.35 The dissenters disputed
the lineup of the states and its meaning, but took no issue with the
majority's statement that federal law did not permit capital
punishment for rape of a child.
Two days after the Court handed down its decision in Kennedy, a
military law blogger reported that the Justices had overlooked a
28. HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 480 (1982).
29. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
30. Strauss, supra note 27, at 373 (citations omitted).
31. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Louis Lusky,
Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,1098-1100
(1982).
32. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419, reh'g denied, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).
33. 554 U.S. at 426.
34. Id. at 422-26.
35. Id. at 448-61 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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recent authority relevant to the constitutional analysis.36 Ten briefs
were filed in the case, but neither party and no amicus informed the
Court that in a 421-page omnibus military authorization bill in 2006,
Congress included a half-page section that amended the Uniform
Code of Military Justice to add the death penalty for child rape.37 The
votes on the omnibus bill were overwhelming, 95-0 in the Senate and
374-41 in the House.3 ' Nor did any brief in Kennedy inform the Court
that President George W. Bush had added the death penalty
amendment to the Manual for Courts-Martial by executive order.39
"We're not talking about ancient history," said the military law
blogger. "This happened in 2006.""
News of Kennedy's oversight quickly spread from coast to coast
when Linda Greenhouse wrote a front-page story about the Court's
"factual flaw" in the New York Times.4' The White House Press
Secretary told reporters that the Administration was "disturbed ...
that the Court's decision might be based on a mistake." 42 In a letter
to the Court, eighty-five Congress members asked the Justices to
rehear the case because "a central factual basis for the majority
opinion was not only incomplete, but inaccurate." 43
The Washington Post editorialized that the Court should "show a
little judicial humility" by rehearing the case." The Justices seldom
grant a petition for rehearing, 45 but the Post said that "[t]he Supreme
Court's legitimacy depends not only on the substance of its rulings
but also on the quality of its deliberations . . . . Before the court
36. Dwight Sullivan, The Supremes Dis the Military Justice System (June 26, 2008),
http://caaflog.blogspot.com/2008/06/supremes-dis-military-justice-system.html.
37. Nat'l Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L No. 109-163, 119
Stat. 3136, 3264, § 553(a) (2006); 10 U.S.C. §§ 856, 920 (2000 ed., and Supp. V); MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, Part IV, Art. 120, 1 45.f(1), p. IV-78 (2008).
38. Roll call vote for H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. (Dec. 19, 2005) http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl09-1815&tab=votes.
39. Executive Order No. 13,447, 72 Fed. Reg. 56179 (Sept. 28, 2007).
40. Linda Greenhouse, In Court Ruling on Executions, a Factual Flaw, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2008, at 1.
41. Id.
42. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Dept. Admits Error In Failure to Brief Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 2008, at 15.
43. Rehberg Calls on Supreme Court to Reconsider Opposition to Death Penalty for
Child Rapists (July 10, 2008), http://www.house.govlist/press/mt0(trehberg/071008
SUPCOChildRapePenalty.html (reproducing the letter).
44. Editorial, Supreme Slip-Up, WASH. POST, July 5, 2008, at 6.
45. EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 15.5, at 814 (9th ed.
2007).
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declares its final view on national opinion about the death penalty, it
should accurately assess the view of the national legislature.""
Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Professor Laurence H. Tribe
urged the Court to "revisit its seriously misinformed . . . ruling"
because, "[p]articularly when the court's division tracks the usual
liberal/conservative divide, its credibility depends on both candor and
correctness when it comes to the factual predicates for its rulings." 47
The spotlight extended beyond the Court itself. The U.S.
Solicitor General did not file a brief in Kennedy, but the Justice
Department's public affairs office responded to the military blogger's
revelation with a statement expressing "regret that the department
didn't catch the 2006 law."a "It's true that the parties to the case
missed it," said the Department, "but it's our responsibility" to know
about the federal law and inform the Court.49
Counsel for the state of Louisiana admitted that the 2006
congressional amendment had simply "eluded everyone's research."o
Defense counsel said that his research revealed only an older military
capital punishment provision that "[wle just assumed ... was defunct.
We figured if somebody in the government thought otherwise, we'd
hear about it.""
Louisiana's petition for rehearing urged that the state's
"significant error . . . should neither inhibit the Court's work nor
diminish its fealty to the Constitution."5 2 "[B]oth political branches,"
the petition argued, "have recently and affirmatively authorized the
death penalty for child rape. . . . Such a clear expression of
democratic will, at the very least, calls into question the conclusion
that there is a 'national consensus against' the practice.""
46. Supreme Slip-Up, supra note 44, at 6.
47. JONATHAN ADLER, Tribe on Kennedy v. Louisiana, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(July 31, 2008), http://volokh.com/archives/archive_.2008_07_27-2008_08_02.shtml#12175
09784 (quoting Prof. Tribe's July 31, 2008 article, The Supreme Court is Wrong on the
Death Penalty); The Supreme Court Is Wrong on the Death Penalty, SEX OFFENDER
RESEARCH: ISSUES, NEWS, RECIDIVISM (July 31, 2008), http://sexoffenderresearch.
blogspot.com/2008 07_31_archive.html (same).
48. Linda Greenhouse, supra note 42, at 15.
49. Id.
50. Linda Greenhouse, supra note 40, at 1.
51. Id.
52. Petition for Rehearing at 3, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (No. 07-
343) 2008 WL 2847069.
53. Id.
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In its amicus brief supporting the state's petition for rehearing,
the Justice Department reiterated its regret for not previously
bringing the recent federal developments to the Court's attention.
The Acting Solicitor General, however, argued that the Court's
''erroneous and materially incomplete assessment of the 'national
consensus' concerning capital punishment for child rape ...
undermines the foundation for the Court's decision."S4 "[R]ehearing
is warranted," the Department concluded, "to ensure that a material
omission in the decisionmaking process has not tainted the Court's
decision on a matter of such profound constitutional, moral, and
practical importance.
The Court became (in the words of the Christian Science
Monitor) "a spectacle of sound and fury"" when it denied rehearing
on the first day of its new Term but added footnotes and a few words
to the majority and dissenting opinions before they reached the
United States Reports." Writing for the five-Justice majority that
denied rehearing, Justice Kennedy explained that congressional
authorization of the death penalty for nonfatal child rape in the
military "does not draw into question [the] conclusions that there is a
consensus against the death penalty for the crime in the civilian
context."' 8
The Washington Post found the explanation "unconvincing" and
warned that "the court may have damaged, even if slightly, its own
reputation" by "leav[ing]-deservedly or not-the impression that a
majority of the court refused to hear new facts and alter their
positions.""
54. Mot. for Leave to File Br. and Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supp.
Pet. for Reh'g at 2 Kennedy v. Louisiana. (July 2008), http://www.justice.gov/osg/
briefs/2008/3mer/1amil2007-0343.mer.post.html.
55. Id.; see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 27 (Sept. 8, 2008) (order inviting the
parties and the Department to file briefs "addressing not only whether rehearing should
be granted but also the merits of the issue raised in the petition for rehearing");
Supplemental Br. for Resp't. in Supp. of the Pet. for Reh'g, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 2008
WL 4359580 (September 24, 2008).
56. Warren Richey, Despite Gaffe, Supreme Court Won't Revisit Landmark Child-
Rape Ruling, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 2, 2008, at 25.
57. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 426 n.*, 459 n.6 (Alito, J., dissenting).
58. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2008) (statement of Kennedy, J., denying
rehearing).
59. Editorial, Case Closed, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2008, at A22.
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III. "Unless the Case ... is Adequately Presented"
"Ours is an adversarial system, and courts rely on lawyers to
identify the pertinent facts and law.""O This reliance, evident in
Lochner and most recently in Kennedy, is a cornerstone of civil and
criminal justice in the United States, but is not universal among
western legal systems.
In the inquisitorial process that marks many European
Continental systems, the trial judge investigates cases, calls and
questions witnesses, and presents evidence; the parties' lawyers
generally assume subordinate roles, often limited to submitting
questions that the judge may ask." Consistent with the court's
dominant role is the continental maxim, iura novit curia ("the court
knows the law"), which suggests that regardless of the content or
quality of counsel's oral or written submissions in civil or criminal
cases, the court will inevitably apply the relevant sources of law.62
The American adversary system assumes that courts do not
necessarily "know the law" unless the submissions of the parties and
amici curiae present it, together with claims and arguments that the
parties frame. As Justice Brandeis ascended to the Supreme Court
bench in 1916, he advised that "[a] judge rarely performs his functions
adequately unless the case before him is adequately presented." 63
Judges and their law clerks sometimes engage in independent
research when an apparent shortcoming appears in the parties'
treatment of issues properly raised, but the exercise imposes heavy
institutional costs on courts that manage swelled dockets, and it
remains the exception rather than the rule.'
Recognition that even experienced judges might overlook
statutes, precedents and other authorities that the parties fail to
present is nearly as old as the American judicial system itself. The
Supreme Court has long held that "[q]uestions which merely lurk in
the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled
60. In re Cont'l Cas. Co., 29 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1994).
61. See, e.g., Roberta Flowers, An Unholy Alliance: The Ex Parte Relationship
Between the Judge and the Prosecutor, 79 NEB. L. REV. 251, 264-65 (2000).
62. See, e.g., P. OBERHAMMER & T. DOMEJ, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, in
EUROPEAN TRADITIONS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 295, 303 (C.H. van Rhee ed., 2005); C.H.
VAN RHEE, Introduction, in EUROPEAN TRADITIONS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 185, 190
(C.H. van Rhee ed., 2005).
63. Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 470 (1916).
64. Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 407 (3d Cir. 1980) ("If the
court is not supplied with the proper tools to decide cases, then extremely valuable time,
already severely rationed, must be diverted from substantive work.").
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upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to
constitute precedents."" This holding, a safety valve designed at least
partly to enable courts to decline invitations to give precedential
effect to an issue previously missed or overlooked, dates from an
opinion Chief Justice John Marshall delivered for the Court in 1805.6
If anything, the sheer breadth and diversity of contemporary
American law leaves judges more dependent than ever before on the
parties' adversary briefing. In recent decades, more and more
lawyers have pursued specialty practices. Specialization means that
judges may come from private or public sector careers that exposed
them regularly to only some of the substantive law that now fills their
dockets. Relatively few lawyers practice civil and criminal law
simultaneously, and intricate administrative rules and regulations
often create doctrine most familiar to specialists.
The complexities that characterize the contemporary legal
landscape leave much room for Chief Justice Marshall's early holding.
To this day, says Justice Antonin Scalia, "[j]udicial decisions do not
stand as binding 'precedent' for points that were not raised, not
argued, and hence not analyzed."68
Conclusion
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist called Lochner "one of the
most ill-starred decisions that [the Supreme Court] ever rendered."6
The New York Attorney General's narrow defeat following his
inadequate briefing reminds lawyers that no victory is "easy" until
after entry of final judgment and exhaustion of the appellate process,
that every case deserves full professional commitment regardless of
the advocate's personal feelings about the cause, and that deadlines
and other law office constraints are poor excuses for half-hearted
presentation.
Amid the sheer complexity of contemporary American law, the
brief writers' recent oversight in Kennedy reinforces the value of
meticulous legal research, free from assumptions and reliance on
65. Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925).
66. United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805) ("No question was made,
in that case, as to the jurisdiction. It passed sub silentio, and the court does not consider
itself as bound by that case.").
67. SOL LINOwITz, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION 91-112 (1994).
68. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 557 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT IS 205
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adversaries to point out potential shortcomings. No Justice today has
a military law background that would have encouraged discovery of a
death penalty provision, even one only two years old, in an omnibus
military appropriations bill numbering more than 400 pages.
Speaking about the role of adversary briefing, one recent federal
district court decision characterized the relationship between counsel
and the court as "symbiotic." 70 The characterization prevails in the
Supreme Court and the lower federal and state courts alike. The
Justices decided Lochner and Kennedy with the information that the
parties provided them, a circumstance that recalls the 1885 instruction
of then-Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes: "The law is made by the Bar,
even more than by the Bench."71
70. Walter Oil & Gas Corp. v. Teekay Shipping, 270 F. Supp. 2d 855, 865 (S.D. Tex.
2003).
71. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Law (Feb. 5, 1885), in SPEECHES BY OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 16, 16 (1934).
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